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RECAP: MASTERS GROUP INT’L, INC. V. COMERICA BANK; 





No. DA 14-0113 
Montana Supreme Court 
 
Oral Argument: Friday, September 26, 2014, from 8:15a.m. to 
10:15a.m., at the Huntley Convention Center in Big Sky, Montana, in 
conjunction with the annual meeting of the State Bar of Montana. The 
matter was taken under advisement at 10:29 a.m. 
 
I. JAMES H. GOETZ FOR PETITIONER 
 
Mr. Goetz started, and spent the majority of Comerica’s time, arguing 
that there was no enforceable contract because the forbearance 
agreement was conditional upon all guarantors’ signatures, and one 
guarantor, Dr. Michael Vlahos, did not sign the agreement.
1
 Further, Mr. Goetz argued that Comerica never waived this condition 
because the agreement specifically stated that a waiver must be reduced 
to writing. Questions from the Justices seemed to indicate that the Court 
believed Comerica’s implementation on part of the forbearance 
agreement was enough to constitute waiver of the condition. Mr. Goetz 
argued otherwise, highlighting that under the statute of frauds principle 
there is absolutely no waiver absent express agreement. 
 
Justice McKinnon then asked, “If you assume that the forbearance 
agreement was not binding, then what are you left with?” Mr. Goetz 
answered the question using Michigan choice of law. He agreed with 
Justice McKinnon that without the contract claims the only claims left 
would be the tort claims of constructive fraud, deceit, and interference 
with economic advantage. However, under Michigan law, these tort 
claims are unavailable. Justice Baker then chimed in. She did her 
homework and brought up two Michigan cases: one that barred tort 
claims, and another that did not. Hence, Michigan law was unsettled on 
this area and to Justice Baker, and potentially the entire Court, it is very 
possible that there would have been no substantially different outcome if 
the case was under Michigan law. Moreover, under Michigan law, the 
statute of limitations (SOL) for the tort claims was 6 years, versus 
Montana’s two years. Mr. Goetz argued that Masters certainly knew by 
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 Oral Argument Audiofile, Masters Group Int’l, Inc. v. Comerica, (link to audio 
file) (Mont. September 26, 2014) (No. DA 14-0113).   
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the time of the financial sweep on December 31, 2008, that it was 
injured. Thus, this operative discovery event started the time clock for 
the SOL and under Montana law this tort claim was time barred. 
Interestingly, not only was Mr. Goetz bouncing between Montana and 
Michigan law, but Justice McKinnon also asked if his SOL argument 
was even brought up at trial. Based on the Justices’ questions, the Court 
seemed skeptical on Comerica’s preservation of the SOL argument. 
 
II. WARD TALEFF FOR RESPONDENT 
 
Mr. Taleff began stating the three faulty theories of Comerica: (1) 
Comerica believes it was inappropriate to try the case in Montana, but 
never challenged this venue issue at the district level; (2) the vast 
majority of Comerica’s arguments on appeal were never adequately 
raised in district court, were untimely, or were on a different basis; and 
(3) Comerica was trying to turn the burden of proof on its head and make 
Masters re-prove all the issues of fact that the 12 person jury 
unanimously found in favor of Masters. Mr. Taleff argued that Comerica 
was deceptively changing the undisputed facts. In the words of Senator 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Mr. Taleff quoted, “Everyone is entitled to his 
own opinion, but not his own facts.” Since the purpose of trial is for the 
jury to establish the facts of the case, Masters urged the Court to defer to 
the trial court’s determination of the facts. 
 
Mr. Taleff also turned to the issue of choice of law, stressing that it is 
Comerica’s burden to show that Michigan law would have has a 
substantially different outcome, which Comerica never proved. Justice 
Baker took issue with Masters’ use of the four-prong-most-significant-
relationship test to determine choice of law. Unfortunately, Mr. Taleff 
was unable to answer the question thoroughly. He explained that various 
Montana contracts were unable to be negotiated and this created an 
economic loss, but he went off topic on a jurisdictional/change of venue 
tangent. Nonetheless, Mr. Taleff made valid arguments on the nonissue 
with choice of law–Michigan law and Montana law are essentially the 
same with the exception of deceit. Even more to his favor, Mr. Taleff 
pointed out that Michigan law allows punitive damages without a cap.  
 
Mr. Taleff eloquently summed up his argument by quoting Justice Rice, 
“If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it is a 
duck, even if it holds a paper saying ‘I’m a chicken.’” Thus, the 
forbearance agreement should be held as a viable contract under the law.  
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III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
 
Mr. Mattioli, for the State of Montana, argued that punitive damages are 
not meant to vindicate any personal right of a plaintiff. Instead, punitives 
serve broader societal interests in punishing wrongdoers and deterring 
future misconduct. Mr. Mattioli also argued that the Court must affirm its 
prior decisions and continue to uphold the punitive cap. He specifically 
referred to Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., where the Court upheld the 
statute’s constitutionality by declaring it rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest. However, Lawrence Anderson, arguing for the Montana 
Trial Lawyers Association, asked the Court to revisit Meech, and 
interpret the punitive cap as jury nullification in violation of the Seventh 
Amendment. Mr. Anderson stressed to the Court the importance of a trial 
by jury and advocated that the post-verdict review of punitive damages—





The majority of the court seemed receptive to Masters’ argument that 
Comerica waived issues addressed on appeal that were not brought up at 
trial. So, if the Court defers to the facts of the case decided at trial court, 
thus not allowing Comerica to raise new issues on appeal, and agrees that 
no substantially different outcome would have occurred under Michigan 
law, the decision will tip in favor of Masters. 
 
While the punitive damages issue was a hot topic pre-oral argument, 
Masters and Comerica both passed the issue to the Amicus presenters. 
But the Court did not seem particularly interested in their arguments. In 
fact, only 14 minutes of the oral argument was spent on the punitive 
damages issue, while the remainder of the 90 minutes was spent on the 
contract and choice of law issues. Chief Justice McGrath’s question on 
major, highly profitable corporations and the minimal punishment a $10 
million punitive cap will have on these corporations, seems to point this 
constitutional punitive issue at another up-and-coming appellate case to 
the Montana Supreme Court, Olson v. Hyundai Motor Co, involving a 
jury award of $240 million.2 It is very possible the Court may wait until 
this case comes up on its docket before making any definite holding on 
the constitutionality of the punitive damages statute. 
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  Olsen v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. DV 11-304, 2014 WL___, (Mont. 
Dist. Sept. 19, 2014). 




Lower Court: Montana Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow 
County, Cause No. DV-2011-372; Honorable Kurt Krueger. 
 
 
Attorney for Petitioner, Comerica: James H. Goetz, Goetz, Baldwin & 
Geddes, P.C., Bozeman, MT. 
 
Attorney for Respondent, Masters Group Int’l, Inc.: Ward E. “Mick” 
Taleff, Taleff Law Office, P.C., Great Falls, MT. 
 
Attorney for Amicus, the State of Montana: Mark Mattioli, Chief 
Deputy Attorney General. 
 
Attorney for Amicus, Montana Trial Lawyers Association: Lawrence 
A. Anderson, Attorney at Law, P.C., Great Falls, MT. 
 
 
 
